This paper studies the propensity of firms to commit to disclose information that is subsequently biased, in the presence of other firms also issuing potentially biased information. An important aspect of such an analysis is the fact that firms can choose whether to disclose or withhold information. We show that allowing the number of disclosed reports to be endogenous introduces a countervailing force to some of the empirical predictions from the prior literature. For example, we find that as more firms issue reports or as the correlation across firms' cash flows increases, the firm biases its report less. However, when we treat firms' disclosure choices as endogenous, we show that the number of firms that commit to disclose decreases as the correlation across these cash flows increases, and this, in turn, offsets the direct effect of the correlation on bias. 
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to our understanding of …rms' commitment to disclose information. Speci…cally, we combine following aspects of …rms'disclosure decisions.
First, …rms bias the information they disclose to change prices in a favorable way. Second, the extent to which …rms bias their disclosure depends on the information disclosed by other …rms. Third, …rms are more likely to commit to disclose information when there is a larger value to managing prices in the future. That is, we investigate the propensity of a …rm to commit to disclose information in conjunction with subsequently biasing the disclosure, in the presence of other …rms also issuing potentially biased reports. Our main contribution comes from investigating a setting with multiple …rms that choose whether to commit to disclose.
By treating the number of …rms that commit to disclose as endogenous, we derive predictions on how various exogenous variables, such as cash ‡ow uncertainty and the quality of …rms' private information, a¤ect the number of reports provided by the …rms in an industry.
In our model, we extend Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) in that we allow multiple …rms to commit to disclosing information ex ante but have discretion ex post about the exact information that is disclosed.
1 That is, a …rm voluntarily commits to disclose information prior to receiving it and independent of its content, but can bias the disclosed information. While our setting seems to be descriptive of …rm's commitment to voluntary disclosure, it extends to certain kinds of mandatory disclosures. For example, …rms choose their exposure to mandatory disclosure regimes when they choose whether and where to list, or whether to adopt IFRS. Prior analytical literature commonly assumes a commitment to disclose; furthermore, 1 This is in contrast to ex post disclosure, which is disclosed conditional on its information content.
1 empirical evidence suggests that this is consistent with various voluntary disclosure choices. 2 We summarize the predictions from our model as follows. With an exogenous number of …rms that disclose, the extent of bias in disclosure is lower when more reports are disclosed and/or when …rms' cash ‡ows are more highly correlated. The reason for these results is straightforward: the more information that is available to investors, the less they rely on a …rm's own report to estimate the …rm's future prospects. As the weight that investors assign to a …rm's report in its own price decreases, the bene…t of introducing bias decreases, and hence expected bias decreases.
With an endogenous number of …rms that disclose, we …nd that fewer …rms commit to disclose when the prior uncertainty about …rms' cash ‡ows decreases, or …rms' cash ‡ows have a higher correlation. In our model, prior uncertainty about cash ‡ows captures the market's demand about information and the quality of …rms'private information. A lower demand for information naturally leads to fewer …rms issuing reports. The result concerning the correlation across …rms'cash ‡ows can be explained as follows. An increase in correlation, ceteris paribus, increases the amount of information investors have about a …rm's cash ‡ow, and thus reduces the extent to which …rms are able to in ‡uence prices by issuing a biased report. Hence, while the costs of issuing a report remain constant, the bene…ts decrease and fewer …rms commit to disclose. This also leads us to predict that in a given industry, the …rms whose reports are least informative about the industry are the most likely …rms to issue one. Finally, allowing the number of …rms that disclose to be endogenous introduces a countervailing force to some of the results from the prior literature: for example, the extent of bias in disclosed information is constant over changes in the uncertainty about …rms'cash ‡ows.
For the main part, the theory-based literature on reporting bias has limited itself to studying bias when only a single …rm issues a report. 3 Most related is Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) where a …rm discloses a report but investors are uncertain about the …rm's incentive to manage earnings. The …rm is therefore able to "fool the market" as investors cannot perfectly anticipate the …rm's bias. 4 This gives rise to a value of disclosure to …rms ex ante because the …rm anticipates that it can successfully react to its future preferences by managing share prices.
While the …rm in Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) always discloses, Korn (2004) , Kwon, Newman, and Zang (2009), and Einhorn and Ziv (2012) study settings where a single …rm decides whether to disclose potentially biased information. In these settings, the …rm withholds su¢ ciently bad news and, conditional on disclosure, the market can perfectly back out any bias because it is informed about the …rm's incentives. Korn (2004) …nds that as the cost of biasing becomes very low (very high) a no-disclosure equilibrium arises (a truthful, full-disclosure equilibrium arises). Because …rm values are drawn from a …nite interval, a partly separating equilibrium exists for some costs of misreporting where …rms with low …rm values do not disclose, …rms with intermediate values disclose biased reports, and …rms with high values disclose the upper threshold. Einhorn and Ziv (2012) allows for non-linear equilibria and shows that the amount of bias increases in the privately observed information.
Similarly, Beyer and Guttman (2012) assumes that a …rm privately observes the pro-ductivity of an investment opportunity, then chooses the …rm's investment level, and …nally decides whether to (truthfully) publish the level of investment. The …rm overinvests (real manipulation) in the attempt to make investors believe that the investment productivity is higher. The analysis shows that while …rms with low and high productivity invest in profitable new investments, …rms with intermediate forego the investment opportunity due to the interaction between disclosure and investment.
There are few exceptions to the single-…rm assumption. These papers either assume that disclosure of information is truthful or that it is mandatory. Dye and Sridhar (1995) considers truthful ex post disclosure by multiple …rms where the information endowment by …rms is unknown to the public and the receipt of information is positively correlated across …rms. In this setting, disclosure herding arises; when one …rm discloses information, the probability that other …rms disclose increases. Similar to our results, Dye and Sridhar predict that a …rm is less likely to disclose when more other …rms with correlated cash ‡ows disclose. Our model, as well as Dye and Sridhar (1995) , assumes that …rms simultaneously decide whether to disclose a report. Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter (2012) studies truthful ex post disclosure where two …rms sequentially choose whether to disclose. Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter …nd that the …rms'propensity to issue reports depends on the extent and sign of their correlation. Bagnoli and Watts (2010) and Fischer and Verrecchia (2004) analyze bias in settings with multiple …rms who engage in product market competition. Strobl (2013) investigates cost of capital implications from …rms' biasing behavior in a setting where a given number of …rms have to disclose earnings. Finally, while Caskey, Nagar, and Petacchi (2010) does not investigate multiple …rms, it allows for multiple actors by investigating a setting where a biased report is analyzed, modi…ed, and potentially biased by an audit committee.
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We consider a one-period disclosure-bias game with N risk-neutral, homogeneous …rms out of which M …rms commit to disclose potentially biased information in a perfectly competitive market with risk-neutral investors. Each of these …rms yields a terminal value ofṽ i , i = 1; :::; N , where the common priors forṽ i are that eachṽ i has a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 2 . In addition, we assume that the covariance between anyṽ i and anỹ v j , i 6 = j, is 2 . During the period, …rms privately observe a noisy measure of earnings, e i =ṽ i +ñ i , where it is common knowledge that theñ i are independent and identically distributed, each from a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance . After observing earnings, M …rms disclose information. Unlike …rm i, the market and the other …rms do not observe the realization ofẽ i . Consequently, the market price of …rm i is a function of the market's prior beliefs, as well as …rms'reports. As …rms'cash ‡ows are correlated, investors use all available reports to determine the price of …rm i. Consistent with the discussion in the introduction, we assume that …rms commit either to disclose or withhold the information before they observe the realization ofẽ i . This implies that whether a …rm issues a report does not, by itself, change investors'expectations about any …rm's future cash ‡ow.
Let P i represent the market price of …rm i and let y = fy 1 ; y 2 ; :::; y M g be the set of …rms'
reports. Because we assume that the market is perfectly competitive and risk-neutral, the price of …rm i is the rational expectation of its terminal value,ṽ i , conditioned upon the set of reports, y:
We assume that …rm i has some discretion over the accounting for the report and can use that discretion to disclose the observed earnings,ẽ i , or to report some other number. We interpret the di¤erence between the observed earnings and the number actually disclosed as "bias" in the report. Formally, conditional on …rm i observing earnings ofẽ i = e i , the disclosed report, y i , equals e i + b i where b i is the bias …rm i introduces.
Following Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) , we assume that in choosing a level of bias, …rm i attempts to maximize its objective function, which we characterize by the expression:
wherex i = x i is the realization of a random event that …rm i alone observes, P i is the market price for the …rm, c is some known positive parameter, to …rm i, and K is a …xed cost the …rm bears when disclosing information. Similar to the broad disclosure literature, we interpret K as proprietary costs or veri…cation costs. 5 As noted above, the utility function in eqn. (2) re ‡ects a …rm's desire to manage its price. We refer to the …rm here as a representation of the board and/or managers who make the actual disclosure decisions. Thatx i is a random variable re ‡ects the idea that price preferences can vary over time.
We assume that it is common knowledge that the variablesx i are identically distributed with a normal distribution with mean and variance , and that they are independent of n i andṽ i . Given its inability to discern the …rm's precise preferences, the market can only conjecture the extent to which the …rm has incentives to in ‡ate or de ‡ate expectations.
Note that as we assumex i has a normal distribution, its realization can be either positive or negative, where the latter captures situations in which …rms prefer to de ‡ate prices.
We summarize the element of time in our model as follows. At t = 0 each …rm commits to either issuing a report or not. At t = 1 each …rm receives a private earnings signal, M …rms that (at t = 0) committed to disclose a (potentially biased) report do so and prices are set. Finally, at t = 2 uncertainty unravels. We solve the model by backward induction, starting with the equilibrium to the disclosure-bias game when M …rms commit to disclose.
A Linear Equilibrium

The Equilibrium at t = 1
In this section we construct an equilibrium to our disclosure-bias game. We restrict our analysis to linear equilibria (i.e., prices that are linear in y and bias strategies that are linear in e i and x i ) because they are easily characterized and yield compelling intuition.
An equilibrium at t = 1 consists of a bias function for each of the …rms, b i (e i ; x i ), and M pricing functions for the market, P i , such that three conditions are satis…ed. First, …rm i's choice of bias for each realization fe i ; x i g, b i (e i ; x i ), solves its optimization problem given its conjecture as to the market response. Second, …rm i's market price equals the expected …rm value,ṽ i , based on all reports y, and a conjecture about the bias strategy of each …rm type. Third, expectations are met in equilibrium. To simplify the analysis, we assume that a …rm's commitment to either disclose or withhold a report is observable both by the market and the other …rms. Thus, we conjecture an equilibrium of the form:
We use …rm i's optimization problem and the market-pricing function for …rm i to prove that there exists a unique linear equilibrium.
A Firm' s Problem at t = 1: We brie ‡y derive the biasing strategies and the market pricing functions as they mainly follow Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) . To begin, suppose that …rm i conjectures that the price of his …rm based on all reports, y, is of the form given by eqn. (4) with conjectured values of^ and^ ij 8i; j 2 f1; 2; :::; M g. The linear conjecture about the pricing function, coupled with the objective function in eqn. (2), implies that …rm i's objective is strictly concave in b i . Thus, the …rm's optimal bias is given by the …rst-order condition, which yields:
for all fe i ; x i g. This implies that iy = ie = 0 and ix =^ ii =c. Di¤erent from Fischer and Verrecchia (2000), we allow multiple …rms to disclose and bias. However, as we assume that prices are a linear function of all disclosed reports, the di¤erence between two reports is irrelevant for investors and …rms. That is, …rm i ignores the reports of all other …rms and the level of its own price when introducing bias. This indicates that if^ ii =^ jj , …rms i and j react in the same way to their individual observations ofx i andx j . Note that because a …rm privately observes its earnings signal, it has an information advantage over investors about all …rms'terminal values. However, as the bias chosen by …rm i is independent of the earnings signal, no …rm has an information advantage about the bias chosen by any other …rm.
Market Pricing Function: Now we turn to the market pricing function. Assume a conjectured bias function of the form speci…ed by eqns. (3) and (5). 6 The market price of …rm i is equal to the expectation of …rm i's terminal value conditional on all reports:
, and (9)
Intuitively, eqn. (6) provides the expression for …rm value that results from regressing the terminal value of …rm i,ṽ i , on the set of reports, y. Note that the pricing function is indeed linear in …rms'reports. Also note that the weight a …rm's report receives in its price is the same for all …rms (i.e., ii = 1 for all i); furthermore, all report other than …rm i's receive equal weight in P i (i.e., ij = 2 for all i 6 = j). This follows from our assumption that ex ante all …rms are homogeneous (i.e.,
the information about …rm i provided by y j is as valuable to investors as the information provided by y k , where j; k 6 = i. As ii = 1 for all i, each …rm's response to a realization of 6 Note that eqn. (5) implies that iy = 0, ie = 0, and ix =^ ii c .in eqn. (3). Because the …rst two results hold regardless of the conjecture about the linear-pricing function, we restrict both to 0 for the remainder of the analysis.
x i is the same for all …rms (i.e., ix = x for all i).
Similar to Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) , the conjectured coe¢ cient on the realization of x i in the …rms'bias function,^ x , captures the conjectured extent of bias. Because biasing activities add noise to the reports, from the market's perspective, the market sensitivity to …rm i's report in its price, 1 , decreases when the market believes that the …rm is biasing to a greater extent. Our assumption that all …rms are homogeneous, however, implies that as j^ x j becomes larger, more of the variance of all reports is attributable tox i . At the extremes, when the market believes reports manifest no bias,^ x ! 0, the weight in price is maximized.
When the market believes that bias is unbounded, j^ x j ! 1, the …rms'reports do not a¤ect prices.
To derive the equilibrium, we replace the conjectures in eqns. (5) and (6) (7), and (9) imply that and 2 are unique functions of x and/or 1 .
Furthermore, from eqn. (5), it is easy to see that x can be written as a unique function of 1 . This implies that for there to be a unique solution, there must exist a unique value for 1 that solves eqns. (5) and (8). Solving eqns. (3) and (5) for x and substituting it in for x in eqn. (8) provides the following equilibrium condition
. Note that the uncertainty about …rms' preferences is crucial for biasing activities to a¤ect the weight of reports in price. If this was not the case, i.e. = 0, the market sensitivity is identical to that attained when …rms are constrained to disclose the observed earnings signal (while …rms would still introduce bias as long as 6 = 0, this will be perfectly anticipated by the market and thus taken out).
Finally, note that F ( 1 ) has a unique positive solution for 1 when the number of …rms that disclose is exogenous. This case essentially re ‡ects Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) with multiple …rms. Accordingly, the characteristics of the equilibrium and the comparative statics from Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) still apply. Speci…cally, 1 is decreasing in the uncertainty about …rms'preferences, constant in the expected value of preferences, increasing in the quality of the earnings observed by …rms and the prior uncertainty regarding terminal value, and increasing in the marginal cost of bias.
In addition to Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) , 1 is decreasing in the correlation across cash ‡ows and in the number of …rms that disclose. 7 An increase in the correlation among …rms'cash ‡ows increases the amount of information an investor can glean about the terminal cash ‡ow of a …rm from any other …rm's report. This implies that the weight the market assigns to …rm j's report when evaluating …rm i increases, and hence the weight on …rm i's own report decreases. In the limit (i.e., ! 1), the weight on both …rms' reports is identical: that is, 1 ! 2 , which can be seen by setting = 1 in eqns. (8) and (9). This result arises from our assumption that all …rms are homogeneous, and hence the quality of, and the bias in, reports is the same. Similarly, the more …rms, M , that issue a report, the more information that is available for the market to assess the value of a …rm. This leads to a lower market sensitivity.
While this discussion indicates that extending Fischer and Verrecchia to multiple …rms does not change the results, it also indicates that the number of disclosing …rms has an e¤ect on the equilibrium. The main contribution of our model is to discuss the incentives that …rms have to disclose information. Speci…cally, we assume that …rms anticipate their interest in managing their stock price. Because variations in 1 a¤ect the extent to which …rms can manage prices, these variations also a¤ect the incentives to disclose information in the …rst place. The following subsection investigates …rms'decision to disclose information.
The Equilibrium at t = 0
In order to investigate the number of …rms that disclose reports and its e¤ect on the results derived above, we …rst characterize a …rm's expected utility when disclosing a (potentially biased) report. Here we assume that (i) a …rm faces additional proprietary cost of K from disclosure; (ii) that the commitment to disclose is made before observing the realizations of e i andx i ; and (iii) that …rms commit to disclose if they expect to pro…t from the option to manage their price. The equilibrium concept we apply is similar to the one in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) : if the expected utility of a …rm that commits to disclose is higher than the expected utility of a …rm that commits not to disclose, one of the latter will also commit to disclose. 8 With these assumptions, using the equilibrium condition that b i = x i ( 1 =c), the ex ante utility of …rm i when committing to issue a report is:
In contrast, if …rm i does not disclose a report, then its ex ante expected utility is given by:
Eqn. (12) provides some further insight to our formulation of the bene…ts and costs of disclosing information. Committing to disclose allows a …rm to bias this disclosure so that it can manage the price in response to its preferences. The ability to manage prices comes at a cost that is twofold: 1) the …xed cost K, and 2) the direct cost of introducing bias 1 2
As investors correct for any expected bias, negatively enters the expected utility, similar to the deadweight cost in the signal-jamming literature (e.g., Stein, 1989) . 9 However, the commitment to disclose allows the …rm to manage price in response to its preferencesx.
Managing prices, in turn, becomes more valuable as the …rm faces higher uncertainty about its future preferences.
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It follows from eqns. (12) and (13) that the …rm prefers disclosure whenever 2 1 2 2c K > 0, which implies that following condition has to hold:
As Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) notes, eqn. (14) can be thought of as capturing the uncertainty about whether …rms will try to in ‡ate or de ‡ate prices relative to the expected 9 If investors did not expect …rms to introduce bias (i.e., if = 0), then both and would increase the bene…t of disclosure to the …rm.
10 See Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) for a more detailed discussion of the ex ante bene…ts of biasing. To strengthen the link between our model and the notion that …rms attempt to "manage expectations" one could assume that the …rms bene…t whenever their preferences deviate from expectations, i.e., when
i . In this case the above condition would reduce to
bias. Speci…cally, when is large or when 2 is close to 0, the probability that …rms in ‡ate their reports (and the respective prices) and the probability that …rms de ‡ate their reports move closer together (i.e., each probability approaches one-half). With this interpretation, eqn. (14) suggests that when ex ante uncertainty about types is large ( is large or is close to 0), …rms bene…t from the option to bias. On the other hand, when …rms almost always desire higher or lower prices (i.e., is small or is far from 0), investors can back out almost all bias from the reports, which makes the ex ante returns to biasing behavior negative.
As the option to move price in the preferred direction is the only bene…t of disclosure in our model, the uncertainty about …rms' incentives has to be su¢ ciently high (i.e., eqn.
(14) has to hold) for a …rm to provide a report: if < 2 , a …rm incurs negative expected utility from disclosing a report such that no …rm would commit to disclosure. For the remainder of the analysis we assume > 2 . Alternatively, in Dye and Sridhar (2008) the market knows the …rms'price preferences but is uncertain about the cost of manipulation.
When withholding disclosure eliminates the cost of manipulation, all …rms would prefer to not disclose (because a …rm's ex ante expected price is independent of the disclosure).
That is, a …rm prefers to withhold information when this eliminates the preference (cost)
uncertainty. 11 We argue that it is realistic to assume that …rms have an interest in managing their prices (see, for example, Aboody and Kasznik, 2000; and Rogers and Stocken, 2005 ).
While we provide empirical guidance under the assumption that > 2 , whether the bene…t of disclosure in managing stock price outweighs the cost of manipulation is an empirical question.
We assume that there are N …rms in the economy out of which M …rms commit to disclose. In order to avoid a trivial solution we assume that N > M . In equilibrium expected utility from disclosure has to equal the expected utility from not disclosing, which, following eqn. (13), equals zero:
Since at the time a manager decides whether to issue a report he does not know how many …rms will decide to do so,^ 1 in eqn. (15) is a function of the expectation about the number of …rms that decide to disclose,M . Expectations have to be met in equilibrium, such that M = M has to hold.
In the last subsection we developed the intuition for why the equilibrium in market pricing and managerial biasing at t = 1 can be written as an equilibrium in 1 . Combined with the requirement that^ 1 = 1 and eqn. (15), the resulting equilibrium is a pair f 1 ; M g that solves eqns. (11) and (15). From eqn. (11) it is obvious that 1 is a function of the exogenous parameters as well as M ; this is the case because the extent to which investors use a …rm's report depends on the quality of information they can glean from it, and also depends on the amount of information they can glean from all other reports. The more information is available, the less weight investors place on any single report. This logically implies that 1 decreases in M . Eqn. (15) then shows that the number of …rms that commit to disclose will
From eqn. (15), it is straightforward that an exogenous increase in 1 will increase the bene…t of disclosure, which, in turn, should increase M . On the other hand, when the number of issued reports increases, investors can use more information and, thus, potentially decrease the weight on any speci…c …rm's report. These two e¤ects introduce a tension into the model and can yield a solution where some but not all …rms commit to disclose.
Finally, from eqn. (15), it is easy to see that 1 can be written as a unique function of the exogenous parameters. We complete the proof by taking the solution for 1 from eqn.
(15), substituting it in eqn. (11), and then showing that the resulting equation has a unique solution for M : the resulting equilibrium condition for M is given by G (M ) = 0, where
and X = Proposition 1 There exists a unique linear equilibrium for the disclosure-bias game: P ( y) = + 1 y i + 2 M P j=1;j6 =i y j and b i (e i ; x i ) = y + e e i + x x i , where M and 1 solve G (M ) = 0,
, and
if G (M = 0) < 0 and
Note that, similar to Admati and P ‡eiderer (2000) and Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter (2012) , when the …rms' cash ‡ows are not correlated, the game reduces to a single-…rm game because eqn. (16) is independent of M when we substitute = 0. The lower bound on the exogenous parameters indicates that when the cost of disclosure, K, is too high
2 ), no …rm commits to disclose. The upper bound suggests that when there are too few …rms in the industry (N is too small) or when the cost of disclosure is too small (
, when N and M approach in…nity), all …rms commit to disclose. In the latter situation, the analysis from Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) applies, as discussed above.
Finally, in the knife edge case of perfect correlation, = 1, all reports are equally valuable to the investors of a speci…c …rm such that 1 = 2 = . In this situation, the condition F ( ) from eqn. (11) (2000), adjusted for the number of reports. That is, the more reports are available, the lower the weight on any speci…c report (via the term M 2 in the denominator).
This reduces the incentives to bias, which makes reports less noisy (via the term ( =c) 2 ).
The entry condition from eqn. (15) 
Empirical Implications
Treating the number of …rms that disclose as endogenous provides a countervailing force to the results documented in Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) . Intuitively, the countervailing force arises because changes in exogenous parameters that make it easier to bias the report also make it more appealing to disclose a report. While the direct e¤ect (more biasing) leads to less informative reports, the increase in the number of disclosed reports provides more information to investors. In this section we provide empirical implications by characterizing the solution to our model.
The Number of Firms in Equilibrium
Before providing predictions on the coe¢ cients in a linear regression of reports on price, we investigate the number of …rms that choose to disclose in equilibrium. Corollary 1 summarizes comparative static results for M in equilibrium.
Corollary 1 When …rms can choose whether to disclose, the number of …rms that choose to do so: (i), decreases in the expected value of …rms' preferences and the proprietary cost of disclosure; (ii) increases in the uncertainty about …rms'preferences; (iii) increases in the quality of the earnings observed by the …rms and the prior uncertainty regarding terminal value; (iv) decreases in the correlation across cash ‡ows; and (v) is ambiguous with respect to the marginal cost of bias.
Note that the results in Corollary 1 are driven by changes in the expected utility from disclosing a report. From eqn. (15) it is straightforward to see that the number of …rms, M , itself enters the expected bene…t of disclosure only through its e¤ect on the market response to disclosure, 1 . This implies that while more …rms choose to issue a report when the expected bene…t increases (i.e., increases or decreases) or the cost, K, decreases, there is also an indirect e¤ect of changes in exogenous parameters. This indirect e¤ect exists because changes in parameters also lead to changes in 1 . For example, from eqn. (11) we can infer that an increase in increases the noise in the disclosed reports, which decreases the weight investors place on the report. As Corollary 1 shows, the direct e¤ect of increasing the expected utility dominates the indirect e¤ect of a decrease in 1 .
The 4
th , 5 th , and 6 th comparative static results (i.e., dM=d , dM=d 2 , and dM=d ), however, are driven by the indirect e¤ect on 1 . As discussed above, with an exogenous determination of M , 1 decreases in and (increases in 2 ). This reduces (increases) the expected bene…t of disclosure and decreases (increases) M . The …nal result shows that the e¤ect of an increase in the marginal cost of bias, c, can increase or decrease the number of …rms that disclose a report in equilibrium. Again, there is a direct e¤ect (a higher c decreases the expected utility from disclosure) and an indirect e¤ect (ceteris paribus, c increases 1 as reports become less biased, thereby increasing the expected utility). Which of these dominates depends on the value of the model's fundamental parameters.
While the e¤ect of c on M is ambiguous, we know that for su¢ ciently small values of c the number of …rms that disclose increases as c increases, whereas for su¢ ciently large values of c the number of …rms that disclose decreases as c increases. The intuition for this is as follows, for c = 0 investors treat all reports as pure noise such that no …rm has an incentive to disclose a report. When c increases investors start to include the reports in their valuation, this provides incentives for …rms to disclose. As c increases further, it becomes increasingly costly for …rms to manage their stock price, which reduces their incentives to disclose information.
Note that the comparative static results in Corollary 1 are a direct result of changes in a …rm's expected utility from disclosing a report. This implies that the corollary also speaks to which …rms in an industry are more likely to disclose. However, …rm heterogeneity can reduce the impact of the endogenous disclosure decision. For example, assume some …rms have very low proprietary costs and the others have very high costs. In this situation, small changes in exogenous parameters have no e¤ect on the equilibrium when all low cost but no high cost …rms disclose. That is, the endogenous entry condition, eqn. (15), would not bind and local comparative statics are, similar to Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) , determined by eqn. (11).
The empirical literature on the propensity of …rms to issue management forecasts in the presence of proprietary costs is based on Verrecchia (1983) and …nds mixed results (e.g., Ali, Klasa, and Yeung, 2014; and Li, 2010) . However, consistent with our setting of a commitment to disclose, Ali et al also document that …rms prefer private over public placements to raise funds when proprietary costs are higher.
In the ex post disclosure literature, Einhorn (2007) predicts that a …rm can withhold information (is less likely to disclose) when investors are uncertain about whether the …rm prefers to increase or decrease stock price. Corollary 1 suggests the opposite: more …rms disclose when the uncertainty about …rms'preferences is higher. The crucial di¤erence is that we study a commitment to disclose whereas Einhorn investigates discretionary disclosure.
Similarly, in a model of multi period ex post disclosure, Beyer and Dye (2012) suggest that as future cash ‡ows become more volatile, more …rms will disclose contemporaneous information to develop a reputation for being "forthcoming." The reputation provides managers with a the ability to withhold more negative information (that is, managers can better manage future stock prices). In Beyer and Dye (2012) fewer managers disclose early as the average probability of being forthcoming decreases. While this is a result of di¤erent economic forces, it is similar to our result regarding the expected value of …rms'preferences.
In line with our results, Verrecchia (1990) predicts that an increase in cash ‡ow uncertainty leads to less disclosure. Empirically, Kim, Pandit, and Wasley (2014) suggests higher cash ‡ow uncertainty leads to a lower frequency of discretionary management earnings forecasts. Kim, et al. partly ascribe this …nding to the negative impact of greater market uncertainty on the quality of …rms'private information. In our model (and in Verrecchia, 1990 ), the quality of privately observed information captures this aspect of the disclosure decision. Higher cash ‡ow uncertainty itself increases investors'interest in obtaining information, which increases the value of disclosure. This highlights the importance of controlling for the quality of …rms'information when investigating the relation between market uncertainty and the propensity to disclose.
Finally, Bonsall, Bozanic, and Fischer (2013) suggests that management forecasts contain macroeconomic information. However, Bonsall at al. do not investigate whether …rms are more likely to issue forecasts when other …rms' forecasts are more informative about systematic events.
Regression of Price on Reports 4.2.1 The Weight on a Firm' s Own Report
In our model, all reports provide information about one …rm's cash ‡ows because all …rms' reports are correlated. In such a setting, it is a standard result that the incremental information conveyed by one report decreases as more reports are available, such that an inverse relation between M and 1 exists. From eqn. (15), however, it is straightforward that a …rm's utility increases in 1 , which suggests a complementary relation. This indicates that the comparative static results on 1 from the prior literature might be altered when …rms are allowed to choose whether to disclose or not. In what follows, we focus our discussion on comparative statics that change as a result of allowing …rms to choose whether they disclose. Corollary 2 summarizes comparative static results on the slope of a …rm's report in a regression of its price on all available reports.
Corollary 2 When …rms can choose whether to disclose, the weight of a …rm's report in its price: (i) increases in the expected value of …rms'preferences and the …xed cost of disclosure;
and (ii) is constant in the quality of the earnings observed by the …rms, the prior uncertainty regarding terminal value, and the correlation across cash ‡ows.
Note the di¤erence in comparative static results in Corollary 2 to the results in Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) . Speci…cally, while changes in exogenous parameters still have a direct e¤ect on the weight on a …rm's report at t = 1, they also have an indirect e¤ect through the number of …rms that commit to disclose at t = 0. That is, while eqn. (11) describes the direct e¤ect of parameters on 1 , eqn. (15),
shows that M will adjust such that changes in , 2 , and will not a¤ect 1 .
Furthermore, while increases in K and have no direct e¤ect on 1 , they reduce M (see Corollary 1), which increases 1 . That is, 1 increases in K and and has an inverse relation to M . Finally, note that an increase in (or a decrease in c) decreases 1 when M is constant. Because M increases in (decreases in c) the comparative statics from Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) with respect to and c are ampli…ed.
Di¤erent from models that focus on a single …rm, we study a multi-…rm game. Because …rms publish reports that are informative about all …rms'cash ‡ows, the market uses all reports when pricing …rm i. The existence of other information suggests that if a …rm is expected to introduce more bias (and hence the quality of the report decreases), investors rely less on his report and increase the weight on other information. Because we assume that all …rms are homogeneous, however, an increase in the expected bias in …rm i's report comes with a comparable increase in the expected bias in all other …rms'reports; this reduces the weight these reports receive in the price of …rm i. When examining the weight of other information in price, this indicates that there are two countervailing forces; these countervailing forces make comparative static results on the slope of another …rm's report in a regression generally ambiguous. To illustrate these forces, imagine a simpler setting where …rms are unable to introduce bias into their reports. The only source of noise in the disclosed reports is the noise in …rms'private information. When …rms receive (and disclose) perfect information, = 0, investors only use a …rm's own report when determining price, i.e., 2 = 0. Increasing the noise to > 0 provides a role for other …rms'reports such that 2 increases. However, with an in…nite level of noise investors will ignore all reports such that, again, 2 = 0.
In order to provide testable results, we investigate the ratio between the weight on another …rm's report relative to the weight …rm i's own report, i.e.,
where X = Corollary 3 When …rms can choose whether to disclose, the ratio of the weight on all other …rms' reports and the weight on a …rm's report in that …rm's price: (i) increases in the expected value of managers' incentives and the …xed cost of disclosure; (ii) decreases in the uncertainty about managers' incentives; and (iii) is ambiguous with respect to the marginal cost of bias.
Corollary 2 shows that su¢ ciently large changes in , 2 , and have no impact on 1 because they a¤ect the number of …rms such that the information that can be gleaned from a speci…c …rm's report remains constant. However, this is not the case for the information content of other reports such that changes in these parameters a¤ect the relative weights similar to a setting with a given number of reports. Corollary 3 shows that the endogenous number of reports does, however, a¤ect the comparative statics with respect to , K, , and c. Because all reports, other than the …rm's own report, are perfect substitutes, an increase in M decreases the relative weights, i.e., @ ( 2 = 1 ) =@M < 0. This implies that the relative weights increase in and K and decrease in . As M can increase or decrease in c, the same holds true for the relative weights.
Expected Bias
The bias a …rm introduces into the report it provides to the market is determined by the weight the market assigns to its report when determining his …rm's market value, the cost of introducing bias, and the …rm's price-based incentives, i.e., b i = ( 1 =c) x i . Thus, the extent of bias in a given report crucially depends on the …rm's (unobservable) preferences. As in prior literature, however, we can make predictions on the expected bias in published reports, where
Clearly, with the potential exception of the result concerning the marginal cost of introducing bias, the comparative static results from Corollary 2 will continue to hold. The sign of the results, however, depends on the sign of the …rms'expected preferences, . For the remainder of our analysis, we assume that …rms, on average, have a greater interest to in ‡ate price (i.e., > 0), such that expected bias is increasing in the market sensitivity. While the comparative static with respect to c changes relative to Corollary 2, it remains unchanged from the result in Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) . That is, expected bias decreases in c. Similarly, expected bias increases in the …rms'expected price preferences. Here, the endogenous number of …rms that disclose ampli…es the result in Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) because as increases, fewer …rms disclose information, which implies that d 1 =d > 0.
Corollary 4 summarizes comparative static results on expected bias.
Corollary 4 Assume that the …rms are more likely to in ‡ate price (i.e., > 0). When …rms can choose whether to disclose, expected bias: (i) increases in the …xed cost of disclosure;
Note that in Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) , expected bias increases in the quality of privately observed earnings and the prior uncertainty. The reason is that both increase the information content of disclosure and, thus, the incentives to bias. The endogenous entry o¤sets this such that expected bias is independent of the two parameter values.
The empirical evidence in Rogers and Stocken (2005) suggests that uncertainty about the …rms' preference increases expected bias. This is consistent with both our model and Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) . However, we are not aware of empirical studies that examine how the variables in Corollary 4 a¤ect the average bias in disclosure.
Price e¢ ciency
The …nal results we derive consider the information content of issued reports or the degree of "price e¢ ciency" (i.e., the extent to which prices re ‡ect all relevant public and private information). One measure of price e¢ ciency is the variance of terminal value conditional upon the market price, V ar [ṽ i jP i ], divided by the prior variance, 2 . This measure re ‡ects the proportion of uncertainty remaining after the disclosure. To perform the comparative static analysis for price e¢ ciency, it is useful to focus on the proportion of variance revealed by the reports:
Corollary 5 summarizes comparative static results on price e¢ ciency.
Corollary 5 When …rms can choose whether to disclose, price e¢ ciency: (i) decreases in the expected value of …rms'preferences and the …xed cost of disclosure; (ii) increases in the uncertainty about …rms' preferences, (iii) is constant in the correlation across cash ‡ows, and (iv) is ambiguous with respect to the marginal cost of bias.
Corollary 1 suggests that greater disclosure about …rms' preferences (e.g., managerial incentive plans) that reduces may, in turn, result in fewer value-relevant reports. While providing information about increases investors' understanding of the incentives to bias makes any published report more value relevant, it causes fewer …rms to commit to disclose.
Corollary 5 shows that the second e¤ect dominates such that price e¢ ciency decreases. Two similar forces are at work when the correlation of cash ‡ows increases. With a given number of available reports, price e¢ ciency increases with an increase in . With an endogenous number, both e¤ects o¤set each other such that price e¢ ciency is constant at all points where condition (15) holds with equality. Between these points, price e¢ ciency increases in : this is similar to the e¤ect on expected bias.
Furthermore, Corollary 5 provides insights pertaining to the value relevance of …rms' disclosures. Settings with an exogenous number of disclosing …rms predict that greater enforcement of disclosure regulations, or sti¤er penalties for violations of those regulations (as represented by an increase in c), increase the value relevance of …rms'disclosed reports.
Corollary 5 shows that this is not necessarily the case when the number of disclosing …rms is determined endogenously. Speci…cally, the comparative static can be expressed as follows
Starting at c = 0, an increase in c increases price e¢ ciency (because
> 0 for small c). However, as c increases the rate of increase in price e¢ ciency declines and, eventually, price e¢ ciency decrease in c. That is, when the cost of bias exceeds the threshold c V =
further increases in c deter a su¢ cient number of …rms from disclosing a report such that prices become less e¢ cient. This analysis suggests that enforcement of disclosure regulations helps price e¢ ciency only to a certain degree. Once the enforcement becomes too strong, further increases in enforcement reduce price e¢ ciency.
Conclusion
In this paper we discuss bias in …rms'disclosures in a multi-…rm setting; this extends the literature on bias in single-…rm settings. We assume that the market cannot observe the chosen bias and, additionally, is uncertain about a …rm's preferences as it relates to managing its stock price. Our main innovation comes from treating the number of …rms that disclose as endogenous. We believe that this assumption is descriptive of many types of disclosure, given that …rms even have (some) in ‡uence on their exposure to mandatory disclosure regimes.
The model allows us to derive novel, and potentially testable, predictions. For example,
we show that when we treat the number of …rms that disclose as endogenous, this number increases in the prior uncertainty about …rms'cash ‡ows, and decreases in the correlation across these cash ‡ows. Further, we show that several empirical implications from the setting with an exogenous number of …rms do not continue to hold when the number of …rms is allowed to be endogenous. This highlights that the number of …rms that disclose information is an important variable to control for in empirical studies. In other words, some of the predictions from a standard model of reporting bias are di¤erent for settings where …rms have to disclose and where they can choose whether to disclose. correlation among the cash ‡ows of …rms i and j, i 6 = j e i =ṽ i +ñ i report about …rm i's cash ‡ow n i N (0; ) measurement noise in report, with variance x i N ( ; ) …rm i's interest in its price, with variance expected value of …rm i's price preferences K …xed cost of disclosing information 
Proofs Corollary 1
Di¤erentiating eqn. (16) with respect to yields: It can be shown that there exist conditions under which either
Corollaries 2 -5
Corollaries 2 -5 are straightforward derivatives of the respective variables.
